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ARTICLES 
APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 
PRINCIPLES TO SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 
UNDER THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND 
CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO) 
Barbara Black* 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO)' was enacted in 1970 as part of an overall congressional 
effort to combat organized crime.¶ The statutory language, however, 
lends itself to applications beyond the Act's primary purpose and can 
encompass ordinary commercial and business fraud claims. Plaintiffs 
alleging securities fraud violations under section 10(b) of the Securi- 
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act")8 and its rule lob-5' 
now routinely add claims alleging RICO violations. Because a plain- 
tiff who establishes injury resulting from a RICO violation can re- 
cover treble damages, the settlement value of his claims is signifi- 
cantly enhan~ed.~ As this aspect of RICO has become more widely 
0 1984 by Barbara Black. 
B.A. 1970, Barnard College; J.D. 1973, Columbia University. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the research assistance of Teri L. Shulman and Laura D. Barbieri, class of 1986 
and 1984, respectively, Pace University School of Law. 
1. 18 U.S.C. QQ 1961-68 (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 4 1020, 98 Stat. 2143. 
2. RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). 
3. 15 U.S.C. 5 78j(b) (1982). 
4. 17 C.F.R. Q 240.10b-5 (1984). 
5. In recent years there has been "an explosion of civil RICO litigation," Scdima, 
S.P.R.L. v lmrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (2d Cir. 1984), rcv'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (1985). 
While there were only a few cases including civil RICO claims in the first 10 years of the 
statute's existence, there are now over 100 published decisions. Id. Apparently, few cases have 
gone to trial; almost all of the reported decisions involve issues raised in the prc-trial stages. 
There is, however, at least one decision awarding judgment for the plaintiff, Fireman's Fund 
Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., No. 83-2213 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 1984), 191 N.Y.L.J. 
June 22, 1984, at 1, col. 2. But see id. (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1985) (avail. on Westlaw) (court 
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known, securities firms and their attorneys, among others, have 
mounted efforts to amend the statute in order to restrict its 
applicat i~n.~ 
An issue that has received little discussion in cases or commen- 
taries is whether a plaintiff can use common law principles of vicari- 
ous liability to increase the number of possible defendants in a 
RICO suit. Actions alleging the "garden variety" securities frauds of 
churning and suitability are illustrative.' A defrauded customer may, 
dismisses RICO claims as to another defendant because there was no distinct RICO injury); 
see also note 26 infra. 
6. The Vice Presidential Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services has recom- 
mended that RICO be amended to make it inapplicable to securities firms, insurance compa- 
nies, banks and other legitimate businesses. Bush Task Group Endorses Amendments to RICO 
and ICA to Reduce Litigation, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 20, at 865 (May 18, 
1984). Seventy-four percent of the attorneys responding to an American Bar Association ques- 
tionnaire said that RICO should be amended, and the most commonly suggested change would 
limit the treble damages award to victims of traditional organized and white collar crime. 
RICO Task Force Reports at ABA Section Meeting, Results of Suwey Presented, 16 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 638 (April 13, 1984). The Interest Rate Regulation Sub- 
committee of the committee on Consumer Financial Service has established a group to propose 
amendments to limit RICO's use in commercial litigation. RICO's Reported Demise, Tender 
Offers, ULOE Adoption Considered at Bar Meeting, 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 33, 
at 1393 (Aug. 17, 1984). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has formed a 
RICO policy task force to consider amendment limiting accountants' civil liability. 17 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 2, at 57 (Jan. 11, 1985). 
7. "Churning" is defined as: 
any act of any broker . . . or dealer designed to effect with or for any cus- 
tomer's account in respect to which such broker . . . or dealer or his agent or 
employee is vested with any discretionary power any transactions of purchase or 
sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial resources 
and character of such account. 
17 C.F.R. 4 240.15~1-7(a) (1984). 
The SEC takes the position that churning can take place not only in accounts where the 
broker-dealer technically has discretionary power but also "whenever the broker or dealer is in 
a position to determine the volume and frequency of transactions by reason of the customer's 
willingness to follow the suggestions of the broker or dealer and he abuses the customer's 
confidence by overtrading." Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 21 S.E.C. 865, 890 (1946), a f d  
Norris & Hirshberg, Inc, v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.D.C. 1949). The defrauded customer has 
a private cause of action under $ 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lob-5, e.g., Hecht v. 
Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). 
The National Association of Securities Dealers Rules of Fair Practice state that a broker- 
dealer, in making recommendations to a customer, must have "reasonable grounds for believ- 
ing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, 
disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation 
and needs." Nat'l Ass'n. of Sec. Dealers, NASD Manual Art. 111, 5 2, 72152 (1979). The 
New York Stock Exchange's "Know Thy Customer Rule" requires a .broker to "use due dili- 
gence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer." NYSE Rule 405 (CCH) New 
York Stock Exchange Manual 7 2405. It is unclear whether a customer has a private cause of 
action under the suitability rules, but suitability is usually an aspect of a churning case. R. 
J E N N I N G ~  & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 571 (5th ed. 1982). 
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under many courts' interpretation of the statute, state a RICO claim 
against the registered representative who engages in such illegal 
 practice^,^ but he will want to join as a defendant the securities. firm 
employing the registered representative. It is uncertain, however, 
whether the employer can be held liable under RICO without a 
showing that it participated in its employee's frauds. Other examples 
are provided by RICO suits against employers based upon employ- 
ees' insider trading violationsB or violations of the tender offer laws.1° 
Part I of this article outlines RIC07s statutory scheme, reviews 
the common law doctrines under which a principal may be liable for 
the acts of its agent and the policies behind these doctrines, and ex- 
amines RICO decisions raising the issue of vicarious liability. Part I1 
examines non-RICO federal cases and identifies relevant factors de- 
termining the appropriateness of applying respondeat superior and 
agency principles to federal statutes. Finally, Part 111 analyzes the 
specific provisions of RICO in light of the factors identified in Part 
11. The article concludes that these factors do not support the impo- 
sition of liability on defendants other than the primary RICO viola- 
tor. Accordingly, RICO should not be extended to reach defendants 
liable only by reason of principles of vicarious liability. If courts re- 
fuse to extend such liability, there will be a significant reduction in 
the number of RICO suits brought against securities firms. As a re- 
sult, the concern over the firms' potential extended liability under 
RICO can be alleviated without congressional amendment." 
A. The Statutory Scheme 
RICO makes it illegal to engage in a pattern of racketeering 
activity to achieve certain enumerated results. A "pattern of racke- 
teering activity" consists of at least two acts of racketeering activity 
within a ten-year period.'' The key term, "racketeering activity," is 
8. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
9. E.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other 
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S .  Ct. 1280 (1984). 
10. E.g., In re Action Industries Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Va. 1983); 
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982); 
Spencer Companies, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. 11981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ll 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). 
11. There are reports that Congress will consider amending RICO to limit its civil lia- 
bility provisions. 17 SEC. REC. & L. REP (BNA) No. 2, at 49 (Jan. 11, 1985). Senate Judici- 
ary Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond has promised to hold hearings early in 1985. Id. 
at 57. See also supra note 6 .  
12. One of the acts of racketeering activity must have occurred after the effective date of 
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defined in terms of a number of state and federal offenses.lS Plain- 
tiffs in securities fraud cases rely on three of these: "any offense in- 
volving fraud in the sale of securities, punishable under any law of 
the United States" (section 1961(1)(D));14 any act indictable under 
the mail fraud statute (section 1961( l ) (B)) ; '~nd any act indictable 
under the wire fraud statute (also section 1961(1)(B)).16 
The inclusion of the offense of "fraud in the sale of securities" 
is curious. Unlike most of the enumerated federal offenses in section 
1961(1), this offense refers to no specific provision in the United 
States Code. Section 1961(1)(D) was a late addition to the bill." 
The only references to securities transactions during the Congres- 
sional hearings were to sales of forged and stolen securities by indi- 
viduals associated with organized crime.18 Some commentators have 
argued that Congress did not intend to incorporate the federal secur- 
ities law into RICO.lB Courts, however, have not adopted this inter- 
p r e t a t i ~ n . ~ ~  The phrase "fraud in the sale of securities" is generally 
assumed to mean those securities violations which require a specific 
showing of fraud or scienter, the most common being violations of 
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and its Rule 10b-5.a1 Additional 
confusion is created by the fact that, unlike section 10(b) and Rule 
the statute and the last act must have occurred within 10 years (excluding any period of im- 
prisonment) after the commission of a prior act. 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(5) (1982). 
13. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1) (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 8 1020, 98 Stat. 2143. 
14. 18 U.S.C. 8 1961(1)(D) (1982). 
15. 18 U.S.C. 5 1961(1)(B) (1982). 
16. Id. 
17. Bridgcs, Private RICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraud in the Sale of Securities," 
18 GA. L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1983). 
18. Id. at 59, n.103. 
19. Id. at 63; see generally Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1534-43 (1983). 
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
21. Macintosh, Racketeer Influenced and Cornrpt Organizations Act: Powerful New 
Tool ofthe Defrauded Securities Plainti$, 31 U. KAN. L. REV. 7, 30 (1982); Long, ~ r c b l e  
Damages for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Applica- 
tion ofthe HlCO Civil Cause ofAction, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201, 226 (1981). Other possible 
securities violations includable under 8 1961(1)(D) are the other antifraud provisions of the 
Exchange Act, $8 15(c) and 14(e), and of the Securities Act of 1933, 5 17(a), as well as other 
substantive provisions which may encompass fraud, such as 4 5 of the Securities Act and $8 9 
and 13(d) of the Exchange Act. One commentator concludes that "any violation of the federal 
securities laws other than the reporting or so-called housekeeping measures should suffice." Id. 
In Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 
(1984), the court held that 4 1961(1)(D) excludes securities violations under Rule lob-5 based 
on trading on inside information where the RICO plaintiff is a shareholder and the defendant 
is an outsider since, under Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), defendant's con- 
duct is not fraudulent as to the plaintiff. 
Heinonline - -  24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 828 1984 
19841 RICO-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR 829 
lob-5, which prohibit fraud in connection with the purchase and 
sale of securities, section 1961(1)(D) only includes fraudulent sales. 
The few cases that have considered this inconsistency have concluded 
that the provision should be read to include fraudulent purchases as 
well.aa 
Commission of two acts of racketeering activity, or two predi- 
cate offenses within the requisite time period does not, by itself, es- 
tablish a RICO violation. The illegal acts must have been committed 
for a specific improper purpose. There are three such prohibited 
purposes set forth in section 1962." RICO securities fraud plaintiffs 
invariably use section 1962(c), which makes it illegal "for any per- 
son employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in . . . 
interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or participate . . . in the con- 
duct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity . . . ."%' Thus, the primary RICO violator is an employee 
or an associate of another individual or entity; the statute is silent as 
to the enterprise's liability. 
Finally, section 1964(c) establishes the civil remedy, providing 
that any person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 may recover treble damages and attorney's 
feesa6 This is the reason plaintiffs strive to assert a RICO claim 
instead of being content with a securities fraud claim. 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Sedima, the cases were 
split on whether to give special emphasis to the phrase "by reason 
of) a section 1962 violation. Some courts interpreted this language to 
mean that the plaintiff must suffer a special RICO injury to have 
standing.'(' Under this view, a RICO claim brought by a plaintiff 
22. The cases can find no basis for including sales and excluding purchases; moreover 
any fraudulent purchase involves a sale induced by fraud. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen En- 
ergy Resources Ltd., 574 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982); Spencer Companies, Inc. v. 
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,361 (D. 
Mass, Nov. 17, 1981). 
23. In addition, 18 U.S.C. 5 1962(d) (1982) prohibits conspiring to violate subsections 
(a), (b) or (c) of $ 1962. 
24. 18 U.S.C. Q 1962(c) (1982). Subsections (a) and (b) of 5 1962 reflect congressional 
concern about the infiltration of legitimate enterprises by organized crime elements. See infra 
note 173 and accompanying text. Subsection (a) prohibits the investment of income derived 
from a pattern of racketeering activity into the acquisition or operation of any enterprise en- 
gaged in interstate commerce; subsection (b) prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of any 
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in interstate commerce, through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. 
25. 18 U.S.C. Q 1964(c) (1982). 
26. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), reu'd, 53 U.S.L.W 
5034 (1985), the Second Circuit held that the "by reason of '  language requires that plaintiff 
allege injury caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter, which is different from 
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alleging securities fraud violations as the predicate offenses is inevi- 
tably dismissed, because the only alleged injuries flow directly from 
those  violation^.'^ Other courts, while recognizing that the RICO in- 
jury and the securities fraud injury are the same and that RICO 
thus serves only to increase the recovery threefold, nevertheless con- 
clude that treble recovery is the plain intent of the statute.28 
B. A Principal's Liability for. a n  Agent's Acts 
A principal may be liable for an agent's torts under fault or no- 
that caused simply by the predicate acts. Id. at 494. In addition, the Second Circuit held that 
prior convictions for the predicate offenses are required to maintain a civil action. See infra 
note 53. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit 
reiterated the requirement of a "distinct RlCO injury" and provided examples where, in its 
view, the injury could be attributable to a pattern of racketeering activity and not just to the 
individual predicate acts. Id. at 512. This is the only opinion even hypothetically illustrating a 
distinct RICO injury. Judge Cardamone vigorously dissented in both these opinions. Subse- 
quently, the Second Circuit in Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), while com- 
pelled to follow Sedima and Banhrs Trust, reaffirmed Judge Cardamone's views. The Second 
Circuit refused en banc consideration of the three cases, Furman at 525. 
The Seventh Circuit, in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chi- 
cago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd,  53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (1985), disagreed with the Sec- 
ond Circuit and hcld that plaintifl' need not allege an injury beyond any injury to business or 
property resulting from the underlying acts of racketeering. 
In Sedima, the Supreme Coun rejected in a 5-4 decision, the Second Circuit's require- 
ment of a racketeering injury as without support in the language and legislative history of the 
Act, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rcu'd, 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (1985). It also rejected the Second 
Circuit's prior conviction requirement. In a per curiam opinion, Harco, Inc. v. American Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), affd,  53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (1985), 
the Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision as consistent with its opinion in 
Sedima. 
Other courts have hcld that section 1964(c) requires that plaintiff establish a "competi- 
tive" injury, reasoning by analogy from antitrust law, Harper v. New Japan Securities Inter- 
national, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982), North Barrington Development, 
Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980); or a "racketeering enterprise" injury, 
reasoning by analogy from subsections (a) and (b) of section 1962, Landmark Savings & Loan 
v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
A third approach is found in Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [I984 Transfer 
Binder] FED. S a .  L. REP. (CCH) ll 91,634 (N.D. Cal. 1984), where the court held that 
plaintiffs must allege either that they suffered an "enterprise injury;" or where the injury 
flows from the predicate acts, that the "enterprise" is organized solely for criminal purposes. 
None of these judicial attempts to restrict the private action can survive the Supreme Court 
decisions in Sedima and Harco. 
27. See supra note 26. 
28. Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, No. C-84-0615-WWS, slip op. at 17-18 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 
1984), Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1581 (E.D. Mich. 1983), Mauriber v. Shear- 
son/Arnerican Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), Seville Industrial 
Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1156-58 (D.N.J. 1983), 
Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983), Windsor Associates, Inc. v. 
Greenfield, 564 F. Supp. 273, 276-77 (D. Md. 1983). 
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fault theories.ae A principal is liable if it is deemed a participant, 
along with its agent, in a fraudulent scheme. This requires, at least 
knowing participation in the fraud, and perhaps intentional partici- 
pati~n.~O In addition, a principal may be liable for its agents' mis- 
deeds if it has been negligent or reckless in their selection or supervi- 
s i ~ n . ~ '  These are "fault" theories of liability. 
The no-fault theories of liability, on the other hand, eliminate 
the plaintiffs need to establish that the principal engaged in blame- 
worthy conduct, and thus provide the plaintiff with better access to a 
"deep pocket." A principal may be liable to a third party injured by 
its agent's tort, even though the principal has not violated any duty 
owed to the third party and has not authorized the agent's conduct.sa 
The basis for a firm's "no-fault" liability would be the common law 
agency doctrines of respondeat superior, apparent authority or a 
principal's liability for its agent's misrepresentations. 
1. Respondeat Superiorss 
In general, an employer is liable for any tort, whether negligent 
or intentional, committed by its employee, so long as his conduct was 
within the scope of the empl~yment.~' Liability extends to frauds 
committed at least partly to further the employer's business, but does 
not encompass wrongs motivated by the employee's personal spite or 
29. These theories may also be described as primary and secondary liability theories. 
Individuals who violate direct duties owed to the plaintiff are primary wrongdoers, while those 
persons whose liabilities arise only because another has violated the law are secondary wrong- 
doers. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, 
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnijcation and Contribution, 120 U .  PA. L. REV. 597, 600 
(1972). 
30. For decisions in the RICO area, see O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. I1984 
Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 7 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984) ("knowing or intentional 
participation"); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 758-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("actively 
engaged in the pattern of racketeering"). Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 
1361 (S.D.N.Y.), a f d  on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 
1280 (1984), imposed an additional requirement of an interest in the criminal venture. See 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 8 212 (1957). 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 8 213(d) (1957). 
32. Id. at 4 216. 
33. The origins of respondeat superior are disputed. Compare Holmes, Agency I, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891) (respondeat superior developed from Roman law) with Wigrnore, 
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its Histoty, 7 HARV L. REV. 315 (1894) (respondeat superior 
developed from Germanic law). It was firmly established as part of the common law by 1725. 
T .  BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 28-29 (1916) (as to negligent acts). Liability for willful acts, 
including fraud, developed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Id. at 84, 121. 
34. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS $8 69-70 (4th ed. 1971), F. HARPER & 
F. JAMES, JR., TORTS 8 26.9 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY $5 216, 219(1), 
231 (1957). 
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malice." When the tortious conduct may result in the award of pu- 
nitive damages or criminal penalties, however, the employer's liabil- 
ity may not be absolute. The Restatement Second of Agency states 
that punitive damages may be awarded against an employer only if 
there is some fault on its part or if the employee was employed in a 
managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of empl~yment. '~ 
This rule, however, does not apply to treble damages statutes, "as to 
which no statement is made."87 The Restatement says that an em- 
ployer "may be subject" to penal tie^,'^ and the comments list the 
language of the statute and its objectives as factors to c~nsider. '~ 
2.  Apparent Authority 
When the employee's misconduct is outside the scope of employ- 
ment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior, the 
employer will still be liable if there was reliance upon the agent's 
apparent authority, or if the employee was aided in accomplishing 
the tort by the existence of the agency re la t i~n . '~  Thus, the principal 
may be liable even if the tort was committed solely to advance the 
agent's personal illicit scheme." 
3. Misrepresentations 
Finally, a principal is liable for its agent's misrepresentations 
that cause pecuniary loss, if the statement was authorized, appar- 
ently authorized, or within the power of the agent to make for the 
prin~ipal. '~ It does not matter that the agent is acting solely for his 
own purposes.48 
Although the common law doctrines imposing vicarious liability 
are well established, their justification has been ~ar ied .~ '  The pri- 
35. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS, g 26.9 (1956). In Moss v. 
Morgan Stanley Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1356 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 
5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984), the court stated that an investment 
banking firm could not be held derivatively liable for its employee's illegal insider trading 
activity, because such conduct was outside the scope of his employment. 
36. REXTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY g 217C (1957). 
37. Id. at 8 217C, comment c. 
38. Id. at 8 217D. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at g 219(2)(d). 
41. Id. at $8 261, 262, 265; see American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982), discussed infra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY $4 249, 257 (1957). 
43. Id. at 8 262. 
44. Baty stated that there were nine baxs for justifying rcspondeat superior: control, 
profit, revenge, carelessness, identification, evidence, indulgence, danger, satisfaction. T.  BATY, 
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mary modern rationale is risk distribution: the use of respondeat su- 
perior to spread losses over a larger segment of the population has 
been viewed as efficacious policy.'This is sometimes referred to as 
enterprise liability; injuries caused by the employer's employees are 
simply costs of doing business that should be borne by the em- 
ployer.'" This rationale by itself may be sufficient justification." In 
addition, modern theory extends risk distribution beyond the enter- 
prise, to the general p u b l i ~ ' ~  or at least to that part of general public 
that pays for the enterprise's products or  service^.'^ Another aspect 
of risk distribution is that it is another protection the state offers its 
workers, so their personal resources will not be exhausted because of 
a work-related tort.s0 
The use of respondeat superior is also justified as a deterrent. It 
encourages the employer to exercise greater care in hiring and super- 
vising its employees, and thus is beneficial to society o~era l l .~ '  
C. The Cases 
There are only a few cases that raise the issue of respondeat 
superior or other agency theories of liability in civil RICO securities 
fraud cases." As discussed above, most concern the liability of a se- 
curities firm for its employee's alleged churning and suitability viola- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  These cases find that the registered representative can be 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 147-48 (1916). He concluded that "the real reason for employers' lia- 
bility is the ninth; the damages are taken from a deep pocket." Id. at 154. 
45. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 499 (1961); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456-57 (1923); 
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 111-12 (1916); Seavey, Specula- 
tions as to "Respondeat Superior," HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 450 (1934). 
46. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administratwn of Risk 1, 38 YALE L.J. 584, 593- 
94 (1929). 
47. Calabresi, supra note 45, at 514. 
48. Id. at 527. 
49. Id. at 518-19. 
50. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 130 (1916). 
51. Id. at 1 16; Seavey, supra note 45, at 447-48. 
52. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [I984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP 
(CCH) 1I 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 
553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), a f d ,  719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cart. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 
(1984); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. 
53. There are other securities cases where the firm has been named as a defendant, but 
the issue of respondeat superior has not been addressed. In many of them, the courts found 
that no RICO claim has been stated, for a variety of reasons. The first four reasons cannot 
survive after the Supreme Court opinion in Sedima and Harco. See supra note 26. 
1). RICO requires a link to organized crime; Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 
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sued under section 1962(c), but not the firm employing him.'j4 T o  
Inc., [I984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ll 91,573 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Aliberti v. 
E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1984); Hokama'v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 
F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Services, Inc., 558 F. 
Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., (1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ll 99,032 (N.D. 111. 1982); Divco Constr. & Realty Corp. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Fla. 1983). An extensive list of 
cases on both sides is found In re Catarella and E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. 
Pa. 1984). 
2). The purposes and intent of RICO were not directed toward the activities alleged 
against these defendants, Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Cal. 1983). 
3). Plaintiff lacks standing because no allegation of an injury "by reason of' a 4 1962 
violation, Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Harper v. New 
Japan Securities International, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see supra note 26 
and accompanying text. 
4). A prior conviction, Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984), see supra note 26, or probable cause, Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 
(N.D. Ga. 1983); Bennett v. E. F. & Hutton Co., No. C83-1502A (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 
1984), must be alleged with reference to the predicate acts. 
5). There is no 5 1962(d) claim because there cannot be a conspiracy between a corpo- 
ration and its employee, Landmark Savings & Loan v. Loeb Rhoadcs, Hornblower & Co., 527 
F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
6). RICO was not meant to supplant fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
Aliberti v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 591 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass 1984). 
7). The complaint did not allege the existence of an "enterprise" apart from the predi- 
cate acts comprising the "pattern of racketeering activity." Bennett v. E. F. Hutton & Co., No. 
C83-1502A (N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 1984); In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 583 F. 
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984). 
8). Failure to plead fraud with the requisite specificity, see infra note 64. 
In the above cases, the issue of respondcat superior liability is not raised. In other cases, 
courts find that a RICO claim is stated, but still fail to address respondeat superior. Heinold 
Commodities v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 31 1 (N.D. 111. 1979); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 
[l983-84 Transfer Binder] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ll 99,674 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Kimmel v. 
Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (it is not clear if the firm was a defendant); 
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Austin v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Nunes v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ll 91,999 (D. Md. 1985). See also Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (court allows RICO claim against registered representative, but not against 
firm, because i t  was the enterprise and not the person under 4 1962(c), and because no intra- 
corporate conspiracy is possible under 4 1962(d)). Witt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., [Current Developments] FED. SEC. L. REP. ll 91,970 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (claim 
against firm dismissed; it was the enterprise and not the person under 4 1962(c)). 
54. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., I1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 
(CCH) ll 91,509 (D. Ariz. 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983). Cf: 
Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Yancoski v. E.F.' 
Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E. Pa. 1983) (claims dismissed as to securities firms in 
both cases). 
It is the "person employed . . . by any e'nterprise" who is primarily liable under section 
1962(c), not the "enterprise." See United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983). Under the most reasonable statutory interpretation, this 
"person" is the registered representative who engaged in the illegal activities, and the securities 
firm is the "enterprise." An alternative reading is possible: the firm is the "person" and is 
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date, courts refuse to attribute the registered representative's miscon- 
duct to the employer. Instead, they acknowledge the potential liabil- 
ity against a firm only on a fault basis, and only with proof of the 
firm's participation in the fraud. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley I ~ C . , ~ ~  
the district court reasoned that section 1961 only defines an act as 
"racketeering" if it is one of the enumerated felonies punishable 
under the laws of the United States. The elements of the criminal 
offense of aiding and abetting must be established to hold the firm 
liable. This requires both knowing participation in the offense and 
an interest in the criminal venture." Other courts have held that a 
firm would be liable if knowing or intentional participation in the 
wrongful acts could be established;" these courts did not require ad- 
ditionally an interest in the criminal venture. None of these cases has 
recognized the possibility of a firm's liability for negligent or reckless 
hiring or supervision of its  employee^.^^ 
Furthermore, all the cases have rejected without extended anal- 
ysis the possibility that no-fault theories might be available as a basis 
for rendering a judgment against the firm without extended analysis. 
In O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Znc., the court, emphasizing 
the requirement of knowing participation, simply stated that an em- 
ployee's knowledge could not be imputed to the empl~yer. '~  The 
court in Dakis v. Chapman stressed the concept of intentional partic- 
i p a t i ~ n ; ~ ~  RICO liability would attach to an "aggressor" enterprise 
and not to a firm that was merely a "conduit" for the employee's 
primarily liable if the misdeeds of its employee are attributable to it. The statutorily required 
"enterprise," under this interpretation, would have to be the individual broker, Parnes v. Hei- 
nold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 ("a strained reverse construction"), or the cus- 
tomer or the customer's investment portfolio. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 
(D. Cal. 1983); O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, slip op. at 7. The latter interpretation is a 
strained construction of the statute. But see In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton & Co., 583 F. 
Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("no conceivable reading of the statutory definition would support 
a conclusion that securities accounts qualify as 'enterprises.' "). Moreover, under either inter- 
pretation, the same issue is presented, namely whether to attribute the registered representa- 
tive's misconduct to the employer. 
55. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). The court stated that even if a civil standard were 
adopted, the enterprise would not have a separate economic existence apart from the pattern of 
racketeering activity. The Second Circuit found that the district court erred on this one point. 
Id. at 22-23. 
56. 553 F. Supp. at 1362. 
57. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. CIV 82-1605 PHX CLH, slip. op. at 9 
(D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (D. Cal. 1893). 
58. Id. 
59. O'Brien v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. CIV 82-1605, PHX CLH, slip. op. at 
9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984). 
60. Dakis, 574 F. Supp. at 759-60. 
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securities violati~ns.~' In Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. the 
court described the use of respondeat superior in this situation as 
"bizarre," noting that the firm itself had been victimized by its un- 
scrupulous employee.6a The tenor of these opinions is sympathy for 
the firm and a refusal to add to its injury by permitting liability to 
be thrust upon it by the wrongful acts of its  employee^.^^ Thus, these 
cases require, at a minimum, knowing participation in the em- 
ployee's fraud to hold the firm liable for RICO treble damages." 
Because the analysis in these cases is so abbreviated, it cannot 
be assumed that the respondeat superior theory issue is settled. Re- 
jection of respondeat superior liability in this context seems an ab- 
rupt departure from modern tort principles; not since the early twen- 
tieth century have there been such strong expressions about the 
injustice of holding an innocent principal liable for the misdeeds of 
its agents.'Woreover, the policies served by respondeat supe- 
rior-loss distribution and deterrence-seem to be furthered by its 
application to RICO. Furthermore, Congress provided that RICO is 
to be "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial p u r p ~ s e s . " ~ ~  Fi- 
nally, a majority of the circuit courts hold that respondeat superior is 
available under the federal securities laws for the predicate offenses 
of churning and suitability. Thus, these considerations require strong 
arguments for rejecting respondeat superior. 
61. Id. 
62. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
'63. Id. at 23-24 n.8. 
64. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires specificity in pleading 
fraud. This requirement has been applied to RICO pleadings. Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 
572 F. Supp. 667, 682 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bennett v. E.F. Hutton & Co., No. C83-1502A 
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 1984). 
Another unresolved issue, assuming that a plaintilT could adequately allege knowing par- 
ticipation by the firm, is what difficulties plaintiff might encounter from the possible applica- 
tion of antitrust's intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 581 
F. Supp. 88, 97 (E.D. Pa. 1983) and Landmark Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Loeb Rhoades, 527 F. 
Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1981) applied the doctrine to dismiss 5 1962(d) claims, while 
Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rejected 
the doctrine in a $ 1962(d) claim. All these decisions predated the Supreme Court's adoption 
of the doctrine in the antitrust area in Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp., 1984-2 
TRADE CASES (CCH) II 66,901 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
65. Holmes "assume[d] that common-sense is opposed to making one man pay for an- 
other man's wrong, unless he actually has brought the wrong to pass according to the ordinary 
canons of legal responsibility . . . ." Holmes, Agency 11, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891). Baty 
stated that the real reason for employers' liability is their "deep pocket." T .  BATY, VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY 154 (1916). Cf. Seavey, supra note 45, at 433-35. 
66. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 8 904(a), 
84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971). 
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This section examines the courts' treatment of respondeat supe- 
rior liability under other federal statutes. Rather than attempt a 
comprehensive examination of the many federal statutory schemes 
where the issue has arisen, this section reviews selected federal stat- 
utes and ascertains factors courts use to determine whether respon- 
deat superior liability should be applied to a particular statute. Anti- 
trust law is selectede7 because Congress frequently referred to its 
remedies as a model for RICO's civil remedies.ee Securities laws are 
examined:' because violations of these statutes are the predicate of- 
fenses that form the basis of the RICO v i o l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Commodities 
laws are examined7' because the violations are similar to securities 
violations, and, again, can form the basis of a RICO v i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~  
While less relevant, the treatment of respondeat superior under civil 
rights statutesTs shows the emphasis given to statutory language and 
legislative history. Finally, cases arising under other federal statutes 
are reviewed: employment discrimination:' labor law,76 and false 
claims.7e 
There is a general judicial acceptance for applying common law 
agency principles to federal  statute^.^' Nevertheless, courts recognize 
that congressional intent must prevail and thus they look to the stat- 
utory language in the first instance to determine that intent. In some 
instances, as under section 1983 of Civil Rights Act, the literal lan- 
guage will supply an all but conclusive answer. In other instances, as 
in antitrust law, the statute is silent as to intent, or subject to differ- 
67. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text. 
68. E.g., 116 CONC. REC. 35,196, 35,197, 35,201, 35,295. 
69. See infra notes 88-106 and accompanying text. 
70. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
71. See infra notes 107-26 and accompanying text. 
72. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text. 
74. See infra notes 135-43 and accompanying text. 
75. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text. 
76. See iifra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
77. American Society of Mechanical Engineen v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 567, 569 
(1982). But see Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) and 
Texas Ind. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), where the court found no contri- 
bution under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 5 4 of the 
Clayton Act. The court reasoned that Congress expressly created these private damages actions 
and failed to provide for contribution, although the express contribution provisions in the se- 
curities laws Securites Act 5 ll(f), 15 U.S.C. 5 77(k)(f)(1933) and Securities Act 5 18(b), 15 
U.S.C. 5 78(i)(e)(1934) demonstrated that Congress knew how to do this when it wished. 
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ent interpretations, as under the securities and commodities statutes. 
Courts will then examine legislative history to aid in interpreting the 
statutory language. Finally, the courts will analyze the legislative 
purpose to determine if the statutory purposes would be furthered by 
application of respondeat superior. 
In addition, courts have expressed sympathy for the principal 
who is made to pay for his agents' transgressions. This attitude par- 
allels earlier arguments opposing respondeat superior theory.?' This 
has led to a dilution of classic respondeat superior theory, especially 
in the areas of employment discrimination and labor relations. 
A fifth factor is whether courts characterize the statute as com- 
pensatory or penal. In the latter instances, courts show a greater re- 
luctance to impose respondeat superior liability on a principal, as 
illustrated by case law under the false claims act. 
A. Antitrust Law 
Congress frequently referred to the civil remedies of the anti- 
trust statutes as a model for RICO's civil re me die^,?^ and RICO's 
treble damages remedy bears a close resemblance to the antitrust 
remedy. Thus, examining the application of common law agency 
principles under the antitrust law seems especially appropriate. 
In American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel 
C ~ r p . , ' ~  the United States Supreme Court held that a nonprofit 
standard-setting organization was civilly liable for treble damages for 
the acts of its agents which were within the agents' apparent author- 
ity.'' The Court first examined general rules of agency law and 
stated that these principles have "long been the settled rule in the 
federal system."8P It then found that Congress intended the antitrust 
laws to have broad remedial effect in order to encourage competition. 
Hence, courts should apply general agency principles that would 
further this intent.88 The Court emphasized that the imposition of 
liability would have a deterrent effect on the organization and that 
this would provide an incentive to insure that similar anticompetitive 
78. See generally T .  BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY (1916). 
79. See supra note 68. 
80. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
81. Members of the society had prepared and disseminated an advisory opinion that a 
competitor's safety device for boilen did not satisfy the code's requirements. Respondeat supe- 
rior liability was not applicable since the individuals acted solely because of personal motives 
and therefore not within the scope of their employment. See supra notes 34-35 and 40-41 and 
accompanying text. 
82. 456 U.S. at 567. 
83. Id. at 569. 
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practices would not occur in the future." 
The defendant argued that traditional agency principles did not 
hold a principal liable in tort actions involving punitive damages.86 
The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the deterrent pur- 
pose of the treble damages remedy and de-emphasizing its punitive 
aspects.86 Thus, as the dissent correctly noted, "[tlhe underlying 
theme of the Court's opinion seems to be that any rule of agency law 
that widens the net of antitrust enforcement and liability should be 
adopted."e7 
B. Securities Law 
Because the predicate acts that are the basis of the RICO viola- 
tion are federal securities violations, and principally section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and its Rule 10b-5,88 judicial discussion of respon- 
deat superior liability in this area provides an analogy.8s There is, 
84. Id. at 572. 
85. Id. at 574-75. 
86. Id. at 575. 
87. Id. at 590. The opinion was a 5-1-3 decision, with Chief Justice Burger concurring 
in the result only, and Justice Powell writing a dissent. Justice Powell was concerned about 
the consequences of extending the exposure of nonprofit organizations that perform valuable 
functions, such as setting industry safety standards, to treble damage liability. Id. at 586. In 
addition, he reviewed the law of agency as it existed at the time of enactment of the Sherman 
Act and found it inapplicable to nonprofit organizations and in punitive damage actions. Id. at 
586-89. Finally, he argued that under substantive law he found no conspiracy, since the society 
was as much a victim of plaintiffs competitors as plaintiff was. Id. at 592 n.18. 
88. See supra notes 13-16, 21 and accompanying text. 
89. There is extensive case law on this issue. Respondeat superior applicable: Paul F. 
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11 (5th Cir. 1980) (employee of broker- 
age firm engaged in market manipulation); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 
1976) (brokerage firm's employee sold unregistered securities); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F. 
2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (brokerage firm churned customer's account); Marbury Management, 
Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980) (brokerage firm's 
trainee made misrepresentations as to his expertise) (opinion discusses prior cases in Second 
Circuit, which were conflicting). In the First Circuit, A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977), and Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 
1978), are often cited for the proposition, although they are not directly on point; Kravitz v. 
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1978) is on point (brokerage 
firm's employee churned customer's account). In Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 
1975), the Fourth Circuit applied respondeat superior principles to hold a brokerage firm 
liable for its employee's churning, but one district court believes that this decision was over- 
ruled in Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
868 (1979), although the latter opinion is concerned solely with controlling a person's liability 
and has nothing to do with respondeat superior, since the employee had left the firm at the 
time of the transactions causing the plaintiffs harm. Compare Haynes v. Anderson & Strud- 
wick, 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981) (Carras overruled) with Frankel v. Wyllie & 
Thronhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982) (Carras not overruled). In the Third 
Circuit, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
Heinonline - -  24 Santa Clara L. Rev. 839 1984 
840 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24 
however, a significant difference between RICO and the Exchange 
Act. The private remedy under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 is judi- 
cially implied; thus, the courts have more extensively relied on policy 
considerations in interpreting the scope of the remedy."O Congress, 
on the other hand, expressly provided for private enforcement of 
RICO. Therefore, statutory language and Congressional intent-not 
the judiciary's perception of appropriate policy-should determine 
the remedy's scope. 
In addition, analysis of the applicability of respondeat superior 
principles to the Rule lob-5 remedy is complicated by section 20(a) 
of the Exchange Act, which imposes liability on "controlling per- 
sons" but affords them a "good faith" defen~e.~'  The courts are di- 
vided as to whether Congress intended the controlling persons provi- 
sion to be the exclusive basis for imposing liability on employers for 
their employees' misdeeds, which would require the interpretation 
that Congress rejected the use of respondeat superior principles. 
While the Supreme Court, in Afiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States,Ba held that a bank was vicariously liable for the Rule lob-5 
938 (1982), held that a firm would be liable for its employee's wrongful acts where its conduct 
is likely to exert strong influence on important investment decisions, as in the case of a broker- 
age firm or where the employee is a high level officer or director, or both. Id. at 181-82. There 
an accounting firm was held liable for misstatements contained in a tax opinion used to market 
a tax shelter program. While Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975) is 
cited as stating the general rule of the circuit of the nonapplicability of respondeat superior, a 
reading of the facts in the case makes it clear that respondeat superior was there inapplicable 
because the corporate officer was not acting in the scope of his employment. Both the lower 
and circuit court opinions acknowledged this. The positions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
are unclear. In Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 
(1968), the court refers to common law agency principles, but it is unclear whether it is relying 
on agency principles or 5 20(a) of the Exchange Act to find defendants liable. The Tenth 
Circuit, in Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974), apparently be- 
lieved that stale law agency concepts should be applied to hold a corporation liable for its 
president's fraud and deceit. 
The only circuit that flatly denies any application of respondeat superior principles, the 
Ninth, does so in reliance on an opinion which did not present the issue, Kamen v. Paul H. 
Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), cert, dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1967). See 
Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978) (law of this circuit that 5 
20(a) supplants vicarious liability of employer for acts of employee under respondeat superior); 
Zweig v. Hcarst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. (1975)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025. 
90. For years, the prevalent approach in the lower courts was to view the scope of Rule 
lob-5 expansively, but in recent years the Supreme Court has reversed this trend by emphasiz- 
ing that the remedy is an implied one. E.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 734-36 (1975). 
91. 15 U.S.C. 78(a) (1982). 
92. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). A few opinions do cite Afiliated Ute as authority, e.g., Carras 
v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc., 493 F.2d 1036, 
1053 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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violations of its employees, circuit courts have not viewed this deci- 
sion as controlling. Disregard of Supreme Court precedent is appro- 
priate here, because the Court decided the issue without analysis.83 
In addition, ~ f i l i a t ed  Ute predates the Supreme Court's opinions on 
Rule lob-5 which pay closer attention to the statute as a whole and 
attempt to harmonize the implied remedy with the express 
re me die^.^' 
The two best arguments for rejection are consistent with the 
Supreme Court's trend to restrict the scope of Rule lob-5's implied 
remedy by emphasizing the statutory framework. First, the Supreme 
Court, in Ernst &' Ernst v. H o ~ h f e l d e r , ~ ~  concluded, after examin- 
ing both the language of section 10(b) and the overall statutory 
scheme, that primary liability under Rule lob-5 required scienter. 
Opponents of respondeat superior argue from this that no-fault lia- 
bility is antithetical to the statute." This conclusion, however, does 
not distinguish between primary and secondary liability. Hochfelder 
holds that no one is liable under Rule lob-5 unless the primary vio- 
lator acted with scienter; nevertheless, Hochfelder does not mandate 
the conclusion that scienter is required to impose secondary liability 
on the primary violator's principal. 
The second argument for rejecting respondeat superior exam- 
ines the legislative history and concludes that congress intended to 
restrict the scope of vicarious liability when it enacted section 20(a) 
of the Exchange Act. While the Senate version of the section con- 
tained an "insurer's liability" standard, the House version, which 
was subsequently adopted, proposed a "fiduciary standard" which 
93. "The liability of the bank, of course, is coextensive with that of [employees] Gale 
and Haslem." Afiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154. 
94. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. ,v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
95. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
96. Id. at 212. The argument derived from Hochfelder is set forth at Fischel, Secondary 
Liability Under $ lO(b), 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 88 (1981); see also Fitzpatrick & Carmen, 
Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (respondeat superior inapplicable). For contrasting views, see 
Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Re- 
spondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007 (1983); 
Musewicz, .Vicarious Employer Liability and $ lO(b): In Defmse of the Common Law, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1982); Note, Rule Job-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Re- 
spondeat Superior, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (1981) (respondeat superior applicable). The semi- 
nal piece in the area, which predates Hochfelder, is Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities 
Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and 
Contribution, 10 U .  PA. L. REV. 597 (1972). 
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imposed a duty of due caree7 Adoption of the House version makes 
it clear that Congress intended liability to be imposed on controlling 
persons only if they participated in the controlled persons' fraud.@8 
Application of respondeat superior principles, therefore, would nul- 
lify the "good faith" defense of section 20(a) and would be contrary 
to this legislative intent. On the other hand, in the view of courts 
applying respondeat superior, Congress's intent, in enacting section 
20(a), was to impose liability on persons who actually control the 
wrongdoer but would not be reachable under common law agency 
principles. Because the statute extended liability beyond that under 
the common law, Congress provided affected persons with the statu- 
tory defense of due care.@@ Congress intended, however, that tradi- 
tional agency principles would apply under the statute. 
Apart from the Ninth, all the circuits that have considered the 
question have applied respondeat superior principles, at least in 
some circ~mstances. '~~ They have emphasized the legislation's reme- 
dial nature and goal of protecting investors.lo1 T o  achieve this goal 
the courts have applied common law agency principles.loa Congress, 
these courts reason, could not have intended section 20(a) to insulate 
97. S. REP. NO. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 5 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933). 
98. Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975); Lanza v. 
Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973). For current views in the Third and 
Second Circuits, see, respectively, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982), and Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. l o l l  (1980). 
99. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 
(1980); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 868 (1979); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 
1978). 
100. See supra note 89. 
101. Paul F.Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11, 11 18 (5th Cir. 
1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-695 (6th Cir. 1976); Carroll v. 
First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 413 F.2d 353, 358 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 
U.S. 1003 (1970); Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, 447 F. Supp. 203, 214 (D. Mass. 
1978). 
102. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 101 1 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11, 11 18 
(5th Cir.); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Fey v. Walston & 
Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052 (7th Cir. 1974). 
As authority for this proposition, some of the opinions rely on 4 28(a) of the Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 78bb(a) (1982) and 4 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 4 77p (1982) which 
merely make i t  clear that state remedies are not affected by the federal statutes. Marbury 
Management v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul 
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11, 11 18 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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firms from the misdeeds of their  employee^,'^^ particularly where the 
nature of the employer's business is such that it is likely to affect the 
investing public, like a brokerage firm.lO' Several opinions empha- 
size that the investor may have selected the firm for its reputation, 
and not for the registered representative he dealt with.''' Hence, the 
firm itself actually provided the opportunity for the employee to de- 
fraud the customer and the firm should be held liable for that em- 
ployee's fraud.''' 
C. Commodities Law 
Commodities fraud offenses, typically involving churning and 
unsuitability  allegation^'^' brought under the Commodity Exchange 
Act (the "CEA"),'08 are the common predicate offenses which un- 
derly many RICO actions. The applicability of respondeat superior 
to the CEA is unsettled. Policy arguments similar to those support- 
ing the application of respondeat superior in securities law may be 
made,lO" but resolution of the issue in commodities law will probably 
be resolved through judicial determination of the appropriate rela- 
tionship among the several statutory provisions. 
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Curran v. Merrill 
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith,"' courts had split on whether to im- 
ply a private claim for damages under the CEA.ll' Curran held that 
there was such an implied remedy, and because of its concern about 
103. Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 916 (1974). Another court feared that unless respondeat superior was recognized, 
accounting firms would have an incentive to create a "Chinese wall" between the partners and 
employees, with only the latter drafting opinions, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 
(3d Cir. 1981). 
104. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 181 (3rd Cir. 1981); Paul F. Newton 
& Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Holloway v. 
Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 1976). 
105. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 639 F.2d 1111, 11 18-19 (5th 
Cir. 1980); Holloway v. Howerdd 537 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976). 
106. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 11 11, 11 18-19 (6th 
Cir. 1976). 
107. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Heinold 
Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Jensen v. E.F. Hutton & 
Co., 11983-84 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 99,674 (C.D. Cal. 1984); 
Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Plain- 
tiffs rely on violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes to establish the requisite predicate 
offenses. See su#ra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
108. 7 U.S.C. $8 1-26 (1982). 
109. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. 
110. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
1.1 1. For a full discussion of the state of the law prior to Curtan, see Leist v. Simplot, 
638 F.2d 283, 296-302 (2d Cir. 1980), which was one of the opinions affirmed in Curran. 
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the uncertain scope of the implied remedy,lla the commodities indus- 
try pressured Congress to provide certainty by enacting express rem- 
edies which would be exclusive. Congress did so in the 1982 amend- 
ments to the CEA.llS Section 22 of the CEA114 gives a customer a 
cause of action for damages against his broker or advisor for churn- 
ing, as well as against anyone "who willfully aids, abets, counsels, 
induces, or procures the commission" of the churning.l16 In addition, 
the 1982 amendments provide, in section 13(a),lle that willful aiders 
and abettors are liable along with primary violators in both adminis- 
trative and private suits.117 Section 13(b) of the amended CEA1lB 
imposes liability in administrative actions on controlling persons for 
the violations of the controlled persons, provided that the Commodi- 
ties Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") proves that the con- 
trolling person did not act in good faith or did knowingly induce the 
violation.118 Finally, section 22(a) provides that the statutory reme- 
dies are exclusive.1a0 
The inclusion, in sections 13(a) and 13(b), of some forms of 
derivative liability suggests that Congress did not intend respondeat 
superior as a basis of liability. This argument is strengthened by 
section 22(a). On the other hand, section 2(a)(l)(A) of the CEA1" is 
located in the definitional section, and as interpreted by the CFTC 
and by the courts prior to the 1982 amendments,laa codifies the doc- 
trine of respondeat superior as it applies to the statute by providing 
that an agent's act within the scope of his employment is the act of 
the principal. This provision has been part of the statute since 1922 
and was unchanged by the 1982 amendments. 
112. The Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n took the position that no additional 
statutory remedies were necessary after Curran and did not undertake to develop statutory 
lang~~age for private rights of action. H.R. REP. NO. 565 (Pt. I), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 157, 
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3871, 4006. 
113. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 8 235, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322 
(1983). 
114. 7 U.S.C. 8 25 (1982). 
115. 7 U.S.C. 4 25(a)(l) (1982). 
116. 7 U.S.C. 8 13c(a) (1982). 
117. Id. 
118. 7 U.S.C. 4 13c(b)(2) (1982). 
119. Id. 
120. 7 U.S.C. 5 25 (a)(2) (1982). 
121. 7 U.S.C. 5 4 (1982). 
122. Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp 
585, 589 (M.D. La.), remanded on other grounds, 600 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1979); CFTC v. 
Commodities Fluctuations System, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1382, 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See gener- 
ally Markham and Meltzer, Secondasy Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EM- 
ORY L.J. 11 15 (1978). 
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Moreover, the legislative history of the 1982 amendments adds 
to the confusion. The House report stated that section 13(b) was 
added to enable the CFTC "to reach behind corporate or partner- 
ship entities" in order to impose sanctions on the persons that insti- 
gate the violations. The report compared that section to the control- 
ling persons provision in the federal securities laws.las This language 
supports an interpretation of section 13(b) as an additional liability 
provision, and would treat the section consistently with the view of 
the majority of the circuits regarding the controlling persons provi- 
sions in the federal securities laws.la4 On the other hand, the com- 
mittee report, in discussing section 13(b), stated that respondeat su- 
perior did not coexist with the controlling person liability imposed 
by that section because the section was drafted to protect controlling 
pkrsons against too expansive a scope of l iabi1i ty."~he committee 
report apparently states that respondeat superior is not applicable to 
commodities fraud violations. But such a view requires that section 
2(a)(l)(A) be read out of the statute. In all likelihood, the committee 
report intended that respondeat superior principles should not be 
used to impose liability on controlling persons where the common 
law would not be applicable; i.e., the controlling person provision 
imposes liability on persons not reachable under section 2(a)(l)(A). 
Respondeat superior would then continue to be applicable in private 
123. H.R. REP. NO. 565 (pt. I), 94th Cong, 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE 
CONC. & AD. NEWS 3891, 3902. ("Among other things, this provision would strengthen the 
Commission's ability to impose sanctions against individuals who are, in essence, the alter egos 
of corporations which have duties under the Act."). See also id. at 142, reprinted in 1982 U.S. 
CONC. & AD. NEWS at 3991 (8 13(b) liability of an executive officer of a corporation or a 
supervising employee). 
124. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
125. "[Section 2(a)(l)] has been included in the Act for many years and in essence pro- 
vides respondeat superior and general principal-agent standards for imposing liability on em- 
ployers and principals for the acts of their employees or agents. The conferees intend that this 
section not be used as a basis for imputing liability to a controlling person of a firm for acts of 
an employee or agent of the firm since it does not include the protections that have carefully 
been articulated in the Conference substitute and would make a nullity of that provision." 
H.R. REP. NO. 964, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONC. & AD. 
NEWS 4055, 4066; H.R. REP. NO. 565 (pt. I), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in 1982 
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3871, 3954. 
The inclusion of this language may be explained by the legislative history of 8 13(b). The 
issue of who would have the burden of proof in establishing the controlling person's good faith 
or lack of it was debated. The CFTC lost its emon to place the burden on the controlling 
person to show he acted in good faith and did not induce the violation. Congressional concern 
was expressed that the CFTC might use 8 2(a)(l) to establish liability of a controlling person 
for acts of those under his control; the CFTC gave its assurance that this would not be at- 
tempted. H.R. REP. NO. 565 (Pt. I), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 142, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3871, 3454. 
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actions under the CEA, because section 13(b) is only applicable to 
actions brought by the CFTC, and probably in administrative ac- 
tions as well.1ae 
D. Civil Rights Law 
While the civil rights statutes are not substantively related to 
RICO, the judicial treatment of respondeat superior liability under 
these provisions is worthy of examination because it provides a strik- 
ing example of the Supreme Court's emphasis on statutory language 
and legislative history. 
In Monell v. Department of Social Seruices,la7 the Supreme 
Court stated, in dictum, that a local government could not be held 
liable on a respondeat superior theory under the Civil Rights Act of 
1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. It emphasized that the statutory lan- 
guagelas plainly imposed liability on a government when its em- 
ployee violated someone's civil rights by following that government's 
official policy. Nevertheless, the Court found that the statutory lan- 
guage could not easily be read to impose vicarious liability on a gov- 
ernment merely because it employed someone who violated another's 
rights.lae 
Monell is also an example of the use of legislative history to 
support a statutory interpretation. The Court noted that Congress 
specifically rejected a form of vicarious liability when it adopted the 
civil rights act, and was motivated partly by concerns about its con- 
stitutionality. While recognizing that rejection of one form of respon- 
deat superior liability does not necessarily imply rejection of another 
form, the Court nevertheless found that "the inference that Congress 
126. Even if Congress meant to eliminate respondeat superior altogether, a committee 
report cannot delete a provision from the statute. A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURI- 
TIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD 4 4.6(463)(13) (1984). 
127. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell involved female employees of the Dep't of Social 
Servs. and the Bd. of Educ. of New York City who brought a class action against the Depart- 
ment and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its 
Mayor, charging that the Board and the Department had, as a matter of official policy, com- 
pelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence without regard to medical reasons. 
128. Any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, cus- 
tom, or usage of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any person . . . to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu- 
tion . . ..shall . . . be liable . . . to the party injured in any action at law, suit 
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (emphasis added). 
129. 436 U.S. at 692. "Indeed, the fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's 
tort became B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did 
not intend 8 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." Id. 
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did not intend to impose such liability was quite strong."'s0 More- 
over, while the remedial purposes of section 1983 would be furthered 
by application of respondeat superior, through both of the doctrine's 
underlying justifications-loss distribution and deterrence-the 
Court concluded that Congress was aware of these considerations 
and had implicitly rejected them.'" 
Monell has been extended to allegations of civil rights depriva- 
tions under other federal statuteslga and to actions brought directly 
under the Const i t~ t ion . '~~ Courts have even extended Monell to pre- 
clude civil rights suits against private employers for the torts of its 
employees which violate the Constitution. These courts find no basis 
to distinguish between municipal and private corporations.'s4 This 
development marks a significant departure from common law re- 
spondeat superior principles. 
E. Employment Discrimination Law 
Courts express conflicting views on the use of respondeat supe- 
rior to hold employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their em- 
ployees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.18Vhe statute's def- 
inition of "employer'' includes agents of that e m p l ~ y e r , ' ~ ~  and some 
courts have relied on this as clear evidence of congressional intent to 
provide for respondeat superior liability.lS7 Some courts have also 
emphasized the statute's broad humanitarian and remedial pur- 
pose.lS8 Other courts have noted that failure to hold an employer 
liable for the discriminatory conduct of its employees would create a 
loophole in the s tat~te. '~" 
130. 436 U.S. at 693 n.57. 
131. 436 U.S. at 693-94. 
132. E.g., DeShields v. United States Parole Commission, 593 F. 2d 354 (8th Cir. 
1979); 18 U.S.C. 5 4208. 
133. E.g., Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. City of Memphis, 
586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979). 
134. Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982); Iskander v. Vil- 
lage of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982). 
135. 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-e-17 (1982). 
136. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e(b) (1982). 
137. E.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979). 
138. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,993 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court did not, however, 
apply no-fault respondeat superior liability; it held instead that the employer would only be 
liable for the discriminatory practices of supervisory personnel and would be relieved of liabil- 
i ty  if supervisory personnel contravened the employer's policies without its knowledge and if it 
rectified the situation when it became aware of it. Id. at 993. See also Tomkins v. Public Sew. 
Electric & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
139. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213, (9th Cir. 1979). Henson v. City of 
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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Conversely, courts have been concerned with the harshness of 
holding employers liable for what may be viewed as the personal 
derelictions of their employees, over which the employer may have 
no contr01.l~~ This concern has led some courts to hold that the dis- 
criminatory acts were outside the scope of employment or were 
wholly motivated by personal malice and therefore were not attribu- 
table to the employer."' Some courts that purport to apply respon- 
deat superior do not do so on a no-fault basis; thus many cases state 
that an employer would not be liable if the employee violated com- 
pany policy without the employer's knowledge and if the employer 
took remedial action after discovering the violation."' Even those 
courts that do apply classic respondeat superior theory limit its ap- 
plication to violations committed by supervisory personnel.14s 
F .  Labor Law 
Attempts by management to invalidate union elections because 
of the improper conduct of individuals campaigning for the union 
present the respondeat superior issue in the labor law area. Here 
also the caselaw conflicts. On the one hand, like Title VII, the Na- 
tional Labor Relations Act defines "employer" to include the agents 
of the empl~yer,"~ and this can be seen as evidence that Congress 
intended respondeat superior to apply.14Wn the other hand, courts 
are concerned here, as with Title VII actions, with the harshness of 
attributing an individual's misconduct to the union, particularly 
where the individual may be a volunteer not readily subject to the 
union's control. Thus, the courts base liability upon consideration of 
two factors: first, the relationship between the individual and the 
140. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the 
court drew a distinction between cases in which the employee was threatened by loss of em- 
ployment or tangible job benefits unless sexual favors were granted and cases in which the 
employee was subjected to a hostile work environment. In the former case, the harasser is 
relying on his position of power to discriminate and it is appropriate to hold the employer 
liable; in the latter case, his ability to harass is not necessarily enhanced by the authority 
conferred upon him by the employer and therefore, he is probably insulting the victims for his 
own reasons and by his own means. Id. at 910. 
141. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), rm'd and 
remanded on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) ("nothing more than a personal 
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism"). 
142. See supra note 138. 
143. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d at 213 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Barnes v. 
Costle, 561 F.2d at 993; (D.C. Cir. 1977) and Tomkins v. Public Sew. Electric Gas Co., 568 
F.2d at 1048 (3d Cir. 1977). 
144. 29 U.S.C. §152(2) (1982); see also 29 U.S.C. 4 152(13) (1982). 
145. N.L.R.B v Urban Telephone Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1974). 
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union, and second, the action taken by the union, if any, to repudiate 
the wrongful conduct.146 In addition, courts have considered whether 
the union could have foreseen the vi01ations.l~~ Consequently even in 
those decisions that purport to apply respondeat superior principles, 
the courts are strongly influenced by factors indicating fault on the 
part of the principal. 
G. False Claims Act 
United States v. Ridglea State Bank14e was an action brought 
by the government under the False Claims Act"@ to recover a statu- 
tory penalty from two banks because of fraudulent loan applications 
approved by an employee. In refusing to impute the employee's 
knowledge of the fraud to the banks, the court analyzed the distinc- 
tion between a civil action for compensatory damages and one for a 
penalty, and characterized the latter as a criminal action. In civil 
actions for compensatory damages, respondeat superior liability is 
imposed for two reasons: first, it encourages careful supervision of 
the employees, and second, because a third person suffered a loss, 
and the employer can absorb that loss more easily than his agent.150 
In penal actions, however, the considerations are different because 
potential criminal punishment serves as a deterrent to an employee 
who, for lack of assets, may not be deterred by the prospect of civil 
liability.lS1 Further, when relief is in the form of a penalty, the pol- 
icy of fair loss allocation is not present.15a 
IV. APPLICATION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND AGENCY 
PRINCIPLES TO RICO 
To determine the appropriateness of applying respondeat supe- 
rior principles to RICO, the five factors derived from Part 11's dis- 
cussion will be analyzed: 1) RICO's language, 2) its legislative his- 
tory, 3) its purpose, 4) sympathy for the principal, and 5) the 
compensation-penalty distinction. 
146. N.L.R.B. v Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1244; N.L.R.B. v .  Urban 
Telephone Corp., 499 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1974). 
147. N.L.R.B. v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239, 1244 (4th Cir. 1976) ("We 
cannot say [the violations] were not of the nature that a union might not expect from unsophis- 
ticated, untrained workers in a hard-fought campaign."). 
148. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966). 
149. 31 U.S.C. $5 3729-3731 (1982). 
150. Id. at 499. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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A. Statutory Language 
Three arguments may be made that RICO's statutory language 
does not support respondeat superior liability. First, RICO contains 
no statutory provision which explicitly authorizes the application of 
respondeat superior principles. While this could be evidence that 
Congress did not intend courts to apply these  principle^,'^^ the pres- 
ence or absence of such language has not been particularly important 
in deciding the issue in the context of other statutes. Antitrust law 
contains no respondeat superior language, but American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Gorp.'" is a strong statement 
for reading respondeat superior principles into a federal statute. The 
CEA,'" Title VIIlSe and the National Labor Relations ActlS7 con- 
tain provisions that support application of respondeat superior prin- 
ciples; nevertheless, the law in these areas is unsettled. In employ- 
ment discrimination and labor relations cases, in particular, although 
many courts purport to apply respondeat superior, there has been a 
substantial transformation of the doctrine from a no-fault to a fault 
doctrine.lSe 
Second, some courts have interpreted "racketeering activity" in 
section 1961(1)lW to require active participation in the fraud on the 
part of the principal.leO This reading of the statute is supported by 
the presence of the express prohibition, in section 1962(d),'"' against 
conspiring to violate the other provisions of section 1962. This sug- 
gests that Congress did not intend to make nonconspirators liable. 
On the other hand, RICO's "liberal construction" clause is some evi- 
dence of congressional intent that' the civil remedies should be 
broadly applicable and not limited to criminal activity.lBa 
Finally, the Supreme Court, in Monell v. Department of Social 
153. Cf. Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-95 (1981); 
Texas Ind. v RadclifT Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646-47 (1981), discussed supra note 77. 
154. 456 U.S. 556 (1982) . See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text. 
155. 7 U.S.C. $4 1-26 (1982). See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
156. 42 U.S.C. $$ 2000e to e-17 (1982). See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 140-43, 146-47 and accompanying text. 
159. 18 U.S.C. $ 1961(1) (1982), amended by Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 5 1020, 98 Stat. 2143. 
160. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1362 (S.D.N.Y.), a f d  on other 
grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984); O'Brien v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., CIV 82-1605 PHX CLH, slip. op. at 9 (D. Ariz. Mar. 26, 1984); 
Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D.Cal. 1983). 
161. 18 U.S.C. $ 1962(d) (1982). 
162. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, $ 
904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971). 
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Se ru i~es ,~"~  emphasized reading the substantive provision of the stat- 
ute to determine whether or not the words naturally lent themselves 
to respondeat superior theory. Under Monell's approach, a strong 
argument can be made that only a strained reading of the statute 
would support respondeat superior liability. According to section 
1962(c), it is "unlawful for any person employed by or associated 
with any enterprise engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce, 
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt."'" Thus, the sole wrongdoer under the 
statute is the employee-associate; it is a strained reading to extend 
liability to the enterprise itself. Moreover, because the primary viola- 
tor is an employee or associate, and Congress was supposedly aware 
of respondeat superior principles, it could have expressly authorized 
their application under this provision if it so intended. 
B. Legislative History 
Monell also provides an example of how legislative history can 
support a statutory interpretation. Though the third argument in the 
previous section based on statutory language is the strongest, even it 
still may not be convincing, because it requires attributing to Con- 
gress a greater awareness of common law doctrine than perhaps is 
warranted. The frequent references in the legislative history to 
RICO's purpose of protecting legitimate businesses strengthens the 
argument that Congress did not intend to impose liability on such 
businesse~. '~~ 
Under section 1962(c), three hypothetical situations are possi- 
ble: 1) the enterprise may be completely tainted if all the employees 
are following a policy of wrongdoing directed by top management; 2) 
the enterprise may be the victim of the wrongdoing, where it has 
been infiltrated by a few employees whose illicit conduct inflicts 
harm on the enterprise; or 3) the enterprise may simply provide a 
setting for the wrongdoing, being neither an aggressor nor a victim. 
163. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text. 
164. 18 U.S.C. 4 1962(c) (1982) (emphasis added). 
165. 116 CONC. REC. 953 (1970) (comments of Sen. Thumond); id. at 35,327 (com- 
ments of Sen. Randall); id. at 35,328 (comments of Sen. Meskill); id. at 35,361-62 (comments 
of Sen. Pepper); Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals, Relat- 
ing to the Control of Organized Crime in the United States, Subcomm. No. 5 of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan); id. at 
157, 170 (statement of John Mitchell); id. at 406, 408 (statement of U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce). 
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In the first instance, the enterprise should be liable as a primary 
violator under either section 1962(c) or section 1962(d), the conspir- 
acy section. Accordingly, liability under respondeat superior need not 
be considered. The second situation was the primary concern of Con- 
gress; there is considerable discussion in the legislative history about 
protecting legitimate business from the infiltration of racketeering el- 
e m e n t ~ . ' ~ ~  Requiring the victimized enterprise to pay treble damages 
to an injured third party is antithetical to this purpose,le7 as this 
would cause additional injury to an enterprise already weakened by 
the corrupting employees. Indeed, it could be argued that only the 
enterprise has standing to sue for its injuries, although the cases to 
date have rejected this ~ontention.'"~ 
Finally, the third possibility-when the enterprise has neither 
participated in nor been wronged by the fraud-presents the strong- 
est case for application of traditional respondeat superior doctrine. 
There is nothing in the legislative history indicating Congress' con- 
sideration of any except the second situation. This fact lends addi- 
tional support to the argument rejecting respondeat superior set forth 
in the preceding section on statutory language. On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court has held that the enterprises referred to in the 
statute include not only legitimate ones, but illegitimate ones as 
well.1B8 That interpretation weakens the argument that Congress 
was solely concerned with protecting the enterprise. 
C. Statutory Purposes 
If the statutory language, supplemented by examination of leg- 
islative history, decides the issue as to respondent superior's applica- 
bility, it is unnecessary to examine the legislative purposes behind 
the statute. Thus, for example, Monell contains no discussion of any 
policy rationale for its conclusion to reject respondeat superior. 
When, however, the statutory language and legislative history are 
silent on the question, as in American Society of Mechanical Engi- 
neers v. Hydrolevel Corp.,170 or are inconclusive, as under the fed- 
eral securities laws171 and commodities laws,17' it is appropriate to 
inquire into whether respondeat superior would further the purposes 
166. See authorities cited supra note 165. 
167. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
168. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
169. United States v. Turkettc, 452 U.S. 576, 580-93 (1981). 
170. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. 
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of the legislation. 
RICO's legislative history repeatedly recites that the statute's 
purpose is to stop the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate busi- 
ness.17' The primary beneficiary of the statute is the general public, 
who must bear the adverse effects of the infiltration."' An additional 
beneficiary is the invaded business itself, which is cleansed of the 
corrupting in f l~ence . '~~  A third beneficiary is the private plaintiff 
under section 1964(c). 
There is a conflict between the interests of the first two benefi- 
ciaries and the third. Congress probably did not recognize this con- 
flict, perhaps because of the late addition of the private remedy.17" 
The general public and legitimate businesses are best served by plac- 
ing liability for treble damages solely on the RICO violator; he will 
be financially ruined, without injury to the enterprise, which has, by 
hypothesis, already been weakened by the corrupting element and 
would be further weakened by imposition of liability. Conversely, a 
private plaintiffs interests are probably best served by imposing re- 
spondeat superior liability on the firm, because the chances of collec- 
tion presumably are greater. Because loss distribution is the princi- 
pal rationale for respondeat superior, it is important to determine 
whether or not it is compatible with the policies of RICO. The pur- 
pose behind RICO is to destroy the racketeering element that has 
infiltrated legitimate business.177 This purpose is antithetical to a 
philosophy of loss-spreading, and suggests that injuries occasioned by 
RICO violators should not be viewed as ordinary business losses to 
be spread over society as a whole. Certainly, the worker-protection 
173. E.g., 116 CONG. REC. 591 (1970) (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602 (com- 
ments of Sen. Hruska); id. at 603 (comments of Sen. Yarborough); id. at 607 (comments of 
Sen. Byrd); id. at 854; id. at 36,296 (comments of Sen. Dole); id. at 35,196 (comments of Sen. 
Celler); id. at 35,201 (comments by Rep. Poff); id. at 35,295 (comments by Rep. Pow; id. at 
35,304 (comments of Sen. Railsbeck); id. at 6709 (comments of Rep. Pow. 
174. Id. at 591 (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602-603 (comments of Sen. 
Hruska); id. at 607 (comments of Sen. Byrd); id. at 820 (comments of Rep. Scott);id. at 
36,396 (comments of Rep. Fannin); id. at 35,201 (comments of Rep. Po@; id. at 35,328 
(comments of Rep. Meskill). 
175. Id. at 953 (comments of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 35,295 (comments of Rep. Poff); 
id. at 35,327 (comments of Rep. Randell). 
176. The version of the bill passed by the Senate on Jan. 23, 1970 did not contain a 
private remedy. Section 1964(c) was added in the amended version of the bill passed by the 
House on Oct. 7, 1970. See id. at 35,227. The Senate concurred in the House amendment 
without discussion on Oct. 12, 1970. Id. at 36,296. 
177. Id. at 591 (comments of Sen. McClellan); id. at 602-03 (comments of Sen. 
Hruska); id. at 607 (comments of Sen. Byrd); id. at 36,296 (comments of Sen. Dole); id. at 
35,295 (comments of Rep. Poff); id. at 35,304. (Sen. Railsbeck, commenting on special mes- 
sage sent by Pres. Nixon to Congress on organized crime (April 23, 1969)). 
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aspect of respondeat superior178 is inapposite here, as these workers, 
by definition, are racketeers. 
On the other hand, such a conclusion may seem objectionable 
because, if the RICO violator cannot be sued or cannot pay, the loss 
falls upon the third party. There are two answers to this objection. 
First, the compensatory aspect of the statute seems secondary to the 
punitive aspect, as discussed below.17B Second, in the case of churn- 
ing and suitability claims, the victim may pursue other remedies that 
will compensate him for his injury under securities or commodities 
laws; where respondeat superior may be a ~ a i l a b l e . ' ~ ~  Thus, he may 
be able to obtain compensation for his injuries; what he will lose is 
RICO's treble damages award and attorney's fees.181 
As to the deterrence rationale for respondeat superior-an im- 
portant consideration in the securities and commodities laws-it can 
be argued that liability under respondeat superior would provide a 
greater incentive to deter racketeering activity within an organiza- 
tion. Nothing in the legislative history, however, suggests that Con- 
gress considered strengthening business' incentive to resist employees' 
racketeering activities. Congress may well have thought that no addi- 
tional encouragement was needed because legitimate businesses 
would naturally resist invasion by racketeers. Again, when the un- 
derlying predicate offenses are violations of the securities and com- 
modities laws, there are already incentives to encourage brokerage 
firms to supervise their  employee^.'^' 
D. Sympathy for the Firm 
As noted above, the few opinions dealing with respondeat supe- 
rior liability in the RICO securities fraud actions express sympathy 
for a firm that has liability "thrust upon it" because of the miscon- 
178. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
179. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text. . 
180. See supra notes 88-126 and accompanying text. 
181. Note, however, that a plaintiff may be able to recover punitive damages under state 
law. See, e.g., Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 703 F.2d 1152 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 92 (1983). 
182. Application of respondeat superior theory to impose liability on firms for their 
employees' securities and commodities violations provides an incentive for firms to supervise 
their employees. Some courts interpret 8 20(a) of the Exchange Act as imposing a duty of 
supervision on securities firms in order to establish the good faith defense of that provision. 
See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438-39 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modi- 
fied on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). The SEC can sanction firms if they fail 
to reasonably supervise their employees; reasonable supervision is met if the firm has in place 
procedures to prevent and detect violations. Exchange Act 8 15(b)(4)(E) (1934) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. 780 (1982)). 
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duct of low-level  employee^."^ While such expressions of concern 
seem to contradict modern respondeat superior theory, they prevail 
in the cases discussed above involving employment discrimination1'' 
and labor relations.le6 These concerns also find support in RICO's 
legislative history, discussed above, with its emphasis on protecting 
legitimate business. 
E. Compensation v. Penalty 
United States v. Ridglea State Bank1'' developed the different 
considerations in compensatory and penal actions. In the former cat- 
egory, the loss distribution and deterrence rationales for respondeat 
superior warrant its application, while in the latter category, these 
rationales are absent. The issue then becomes whether RICO is pri- 
marily a penal or a compensatory statute. The more it resembles a 
penal statute, the less appropriate respondeat superior appears to be. 
The original and predominant motivation for the statute was to 
enable the government to prosecute organized crime more effectively. 
RICO was only one article in the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970, which was intended to be a comprehensive weapon in the war 
against organized crime.''' Indeed, one controversial provision in the 
law was the revival of the penalty of criminal forfeiture.le8 
On the other hand, the Senate Report accompanying the Or- 
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 emphasized that the RICO civil 
provisions were remedial and not penal.18B This characterization is 
supported by the statute's "liberal construction" clause.1B0 The later 
addition of the treble damages provision, it can be argued, does not 
affect this classification of the statute. The legislative history repeat- 
edly refers to the civil remedies of the antitrust laws, and the treble 
damages provision was modeled after that contained in the antitrust 
183. See, e.g., Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 
1982). 
184. See supm note 140 and accompanying text. 
185. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text. 
186. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966). See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text. 
187. Courts have characterized RICO as primarily a criminal statute. E.g., Sevill In- 
dustrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985). 
188. Section 1963(c). 
189. S. Rep. 91-617 (91st Cong., 1st Sess.) 81-82 (1969). The version of RICO enacted 
by the Senate did not contain any private remedies. ". . . there is no intent to visit punishment 
on any individual; the purpose is civil. Punishment as such is limited to the criminal reme- 
dies. . . . . Title IX, it must be again emphasized, is remedial rather than penal." 
190. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 9 
904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 (1971). 
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law. The Supreme Court, moreover, in Hydrolevel, rejected the ar- 
gument that the antitrust treble damages remedy should be charac- 
terized as a penal statute.lel 
While the Senate Report thus provides the best support for the 
position that RICO should be viewed as remedial legislation, it 
should be noted that the report solely addressed the civil remedies 
available to the government, for the purpose of reforming the cor- 
rupted organiza t i~n. '~~ The conflict between this purpose and the 
interests of the private plaintiff has already been noted.le3 
Thus, on balance, the loss distribution and deterrence rationales 
enunciated in United States er, ~ i h ~ l e a  St te Bank are inappropriate 
considerations in the RICO context; and the statute, in fact, is better 
classified as penal for resolution of the respondeat superior issue. 
Part IV has analyzed the specific provisions of RICO in light of 
the relevant factors outlined in Part 111. While the statutory lan- 
guage arguments are inconclusive, they support an argument re- 
jecting respondeat superior. Examination of legislative history, while 
also not conclusive, provides greater support for rejection. An analy- 
sis of the legislative purpose, viewed in the light of Congress's spe- 
cific concerns and the general policies of respondeat superior, provide 
the strongest arguments for rejection. Finally, sentiments of sympa- 
thy for the firm find support in the legislative history, as does the 
distinction between compensatory and penal actions. 
Therefore, in the typical RICO civil action brought by a de- 
frauded customer, alleging churning and suitability violations, the 
only appropriate defendant is the registered representative who de- 
frauded the customer, and not the securities firm itself. Judicial re- 
jection of respondeat superior in these circumstances should reduce 
the tremendous number of RICO clams currently naming firms as 
defendants and is consistent with RICO's statutory language and un- 
derlying purposes. Accordingly, the perception that amendment of 
RICO to restrict its application is necessary to reduce the number of 
civil RICO claims brought against securities firms and others is 
faulty, because judicial recognition of the inapplicability of respon- 
deat superior principles would result in dismissal of many of these 
claims. 
191. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
192. S. Rep. supra note 189, at 81-82. 
193. See supra notes 176-78. 
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